In the EU, we are also observing increasingly aggressive and offensive measures against civil society organisations (NGOs), including those involved in civic education and non-formal education. The days when the public associated the term ‘civil society’ with predominantly positive connotations are long gone. The smear campaigns by the far right have left their mark.
Paradoxically, it is precisely because we recognise that civil society is diverse and pluralistic that we can now see more clearly how the concept of democratic civil society is being challenged from within. In association with politicians, religious leaders and media actors, it is also NGOs promoting a social shift away from liberal democracy, including the weakening of individual rights, pluralism, representation and participation. As a colleague from an affected EU country said:
‘They cultivate their allergy to everything progressive/liberal.’
This coordinated and aggressive suspicion of ‘wokeness’ at every turn frightens many. Even without further measures from above, it leads to self-censorship in civil society, especially among organisationally weak groups and those who have taken up the cause of democracy and human rights education. Some quietly capitulate to the polarisation entrepreneurs at the international, national and local levels in their own environment. Beyond such general attempts to undermine the reputation of non-profit organisations and civil society, administrative and political measures from above are increasingly hampering the ability of civil society in Europe to act. Here are a few examples:
Alleged political distortion of competition: Politicians and the state demand that civil society actors remain politically neutral – neither ‘competing’ with political parties nor expressing overly vocal opinions on socio-political issues that could be interpreted as supporting the position of one party in the political arena. However, this may be precisely their role in a pluralistic public sphere. In addition, civil society actors repeatedly remind parties that they must not monopolise public discourse on political issues. As the German constitution states, ‘The parties shall participate in the political decision-making process of the people’ – in other words, they shall cooperate with others.
The state can burden NGOs with excessive bureaucracy and contradictory obligations, thereby hindering them. In some countries, the accountability requirements for NGOs are more complicated than those for small businesses.
Parties and MPs can use parliamentary questions to the government as a means of ‘singling out’ certain NGOs and scandalising them. The question of which NGOs have received state funding for sex education quickly turns into a veritable storm on social media, triggered by the support networks of the politicians asking the question, along the lines of ‘these are the organisations spreading gender madness at the taxpayer’s expense’. Authorities then follow up with further inquiries, requests for statements, etc. Initiatives and small organisations are thus quickly forced into a bureaucratic justification process and overwhelmed with negative PR.
Many things can be changed in amended rules and implementing regulations. Authoritarian parties and bureaucrats could easily change the funding rules or eligibility criteria or competition procedures without encountering any significant checks and balances, such as those provided by the parliamentary legislative process.
Fictitious neutrality: One objection is that if the state is to be ‘neutral’, this must apply to civil servants, public activities and also recipients of state subsidies or state-granted privileges (such as tax exemptions). NGOs thus become executive civil servants. However, the prevailing legal opinion is different: NGOs have a specific purpose and a specific position that they legitimately represent in public. Even if they are funded by the state for a specific purpose, they cannot and should not deny their positions. On the contrary, the state depends on diversity in civil society being able to flourish. If loyalty can be demanded of civil society, then above all it must be to fundamental democratic principles and fundamental rights.
State regulations are not always appropriate and realistic. Examples of this include: sometimes non-governmental organisations must formally sign a declaration that they will not use public funds to support ‘extremism’, even though it is impossible for them to guarantee that extremists will not participate in open events. The definition of the term ‘extremist’ is also controversial. In addition, the categories for tax exemptions or reductions may not correspond to social developments. In Germany, for example, cultural and educational purposes are considered legitimate, but support for socio-political civil society engagement is not. The rules therefore follow a more traditional model of democracy.
Another example is the perverted application of accountability: ‘transparency’ rules can be designed in such a way that they serve to publicly expose NGOs and their employees as ‘foreign agents’ as soon as they receive part of their income from European and international sources. In Slovakia, this applies to anyone who earns more than €5,000 per year from cross-border sources, including the EU.
Withdrawal of financial privileges: In several countries, a certain percentage of income tax can be paid to NGOs, for example 1.5% in Poland. For many NGOs, this is a fundamental source of income. In other countries, such as Germany, there are tax exemptions and rules on the deductibility of donations to state-recognised organisations and parties.
Restrictions on the scope of action of NGOs in the interest of protecting minors, for example, on the grounds that they would disturb children with ‘controversial’ topics such as sex education and alternative gender models. Their exclusion from schools, for example, is justified by a 180-degree shift in the concept of youth protection. After all, it was originally minority groups from civil society who supported young people who did not feel they belonged to the cultural and religious expectations of their environment through educational opportunities, or who were the first to address taboo topics in an educational context. In Germany, we are familiar with the variant in which the professional standard of ‘prohibition of coercion’ is used to derive a requirement for ideological neutrality in teaching and learning programmes. One would have to misread the Beutelsbach Consensus on political education very badly to conclude that this is either pedagogically sound or legally justified.
Tensions can also arise when an issue is politicized (not necessarily by an NGO itself, e.g., sea rescue or climate change). Then it is easy to accuse an NGO of political interference.
This list cannot claim to develop a typology of the neutralization of independent organizations. It points us to one of the battle zones of the coming years. Cultural battles that are skeptical of democracy can only be won if the majority of democratic civil society is weakened, dimmed, and hindered.
In this context, increasing democratic resilience means strengthening civil society organizations, toughening fair rules and procedures, and, above all, providing legal protection. All political leaders must realize that they are playing with fire when they adopt the anti-NGO narrative from the far-right and Christian fundamentalist spectrum. We in Germany would be well advised to look at the laboratory of authoritarianism and see how it is currently developing beyond our horizons. Some of it will